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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO AN 
.ADMINISTRATIVE .ARlu:sT-As a preliminary to deportation proceedings, de-
fendant, Rudolf I. Abel, was arrested in his hotel room by Immigration and 
Naturalization Service agents who acted pursuant to a valid administrative 
arrest warrant.1 After the arrest, but without a search warrant, the INS 
searched Abel's room and seized evidence later used in his trial for espionage. 
In the district court Abel moved to suppress this evidence on the theory that 
the search violated the fourth amendment. The district court's denial of 
the motion2 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.3 
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, four Jus-
tices dissenting.4 Although made without a search warrant, a search in-
cidental to a lawful5 administrative arrest does not violate the fourth 
amendment. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
The right of an officer without a search warrant6 to search a lawfully 
arrested person has long been held to be consistent with fourth amend-
ment limitations, whether the arrest was made with or without an arrest 
warrant.7 Although the scope of permissible search has been extended be-
yond the person to the surrounding area,s this right to search without a 
warrant has been limited, with few exceptions,9 to criminal arrest cases. 
Since the deportation proceeding has been classified as civil10 rather than 
criminal, the principal case raised the basic question whether the adminis-
trative arrest for deportation sufficiently resembled the criminal arrest to 
justify an incidental search without a warrant. The soundness of the ma-
jority's finding that no constitutional distinctions exist can be displayed by 
1 Arrest prior to deportation proceedings is authorized by Immigration Act of 1952 
§ 242, 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (a) (1958). 
2 United States v. Abel, 155 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). 
3 United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1958). 
4 Justice Douglas' dissent, in which Justice Black joined, was based upon the FBI's 
use of a civil proceeding to accomplish a criminal arrest. The FBI notified the INS of 
Abel's presence and was present at the arrest. The Court found good faith in the INS 
actions. The good faith test appears to allow wide latitude to the police in their use 
of administrative agencies. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and the 
Chief Justice, found no right to search incidental to an administrative arrest. 
5 Because of the long acceptance of the administrative arrest and of the defendant's 
admission of the legality of the arrest below, the Court did not give serious consideration 
to the petitioner's claim that the arrest itself was invalid. 
61 BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 210, 211 (2d ed. 1872); Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 
101 (1876); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
7 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925). 
s Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 
(1927). 
9 For some examples of the limited right to search without a warrant, see Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (health inspector); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 
764 (1955) (health inspector); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952) (INS 
officer at and near border); Wrs. STAT. § 29.05 (6) (1957) (game warden). 
10 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 
(1912). 
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a comparison of the purposes and effects of the two proceedings in three 
areas: (1) the degree of public interest involved in deportation and crim-
inal prosecution; (2) the necessity for the search in implementing this in-
terest; and (3) the quality of protection against unreasonable search which 
is given to the suspected alien and criminal. 
Basically, the concept of permissible search represents a balance be-
tween the right of the individual to privacy and the protection of society 
from undesirable persons and antisocial influences.11 The public interest 
in deportation was recognized by Congress in early, and now comprehensive, 
legislation12 and is not substantially different from the interest in the 
prosecution of criminals. Indeed, conviction of certain crimes is a ground 
for deportation.is Moreover, it was long argued that deportation was a 
criminal proceeding.14 The search incidental to a criminal arrest serves to 
protect this public interest by removing from the arrested person115 weapons 
or other means of escape and by seizing evidence before its destruction or 
secretion.16 The desire to escape and likelihood of destruction of relevant 
evidence appear equally great in incidents of deportation arrest. 
Thus, if the public interest and need are significant, the fourth amend-
ment should prevent a search incidental to administrative arrest only if the 
protection against unjustified intrusion is materially lower than in the crim-
inal case. In dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan found the absence of judicial inter-
vention in the administrative procedure to be such a deficiency.17 In crim-
inal procedure, if the federal commissioner1 8 finds no "probable cause"19 
for arrest and therefore refuses to issue an arrest warrant, the arrest will 
probably not be made and a fortiori there will be no incidental search. 
However, since his investigation is restricted to the question of probable 
cause for arrest, the commissioner lacks the power to prevent unreasonable 
11 Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454, 456 (1859): "Search warrants were 
never recognized ... for the maintenance of any mere private right, but [were] •.. 
confined to cases of public prosecution." 
121 Stat. 571 (1798); Immigration Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 166, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 
(1958). 
18 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1958). 
14 See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Zakonaite v. Wolf, supra note 10. 
lti Even the dissent implicitly recognizes this need to search the person. Principal case 
at 250-51. 
16 Reifsnyder v. Lee, supra note 6. For Judge Cardozo's statement of the purposes, see 
State v. Chaigles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). 
17 It may be argued that the magistrate is particularly necessary in this situation 
to bar collusive action by the FBI and INS. However, the magistrate would have great 
difficulty in preventing situations such as the present one if the FBI is able to give the 
INS evidence sufficient to prove a prima fade case of deportability. 
18 The United States commissioners are appointed by the district courts, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 631 (1958), and have been termed "justice[s] of the peace of the United States." United 
States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). Under the Federal Rules the pro-
ceedings are held before a "commissioner or other officer empowered to commit. • • ." 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 3. 
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 requires "probable cause to believe that an offense has been com-
mitted and that the defendant has committed it .••. " 
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searches incidental to valid arrests. Moreover, when the arrest is made with-
out a warrant,20 he has no opportunity to exercise even this limited power 
before the search. Under the administrative procedure the INS agent, 
who may not arrest without a warrant, must present a prima fade basis 
for arrest to his district director in order to obtain a warrant.21 This pro-
cedure appears weaker than the judicial process because the district director 
would tend to review less objectively the activities of his subordinates. 
Nevertheless, if the commissioner's investigation before issuing the warrant 
is as perfunctory and ineffective as the magistrate's hearing at the state level 
has been shown to be,22 only limited protection is offered by the proceed-
ing. In the post-arrest preliminary hearing the commissioner makes more 
extensive review of probable cause for arrest.23 However, because the search 
will have been completed and because the power of the federal commis-
sioner to suppress evidence has now been removed,24 this hearing, which may 
result in refusal to bind over to the district court, can have only the tangen-
tial effect of deterring arrests on insufficient evidence, and this deterrent 
value of the proceeding will be realized only if commissioners conduct effec-
tive investigations. Therefore, in view of the questionable practical value of 
this judicial intervention and the comparable public interest and necessity 
for an incidental right to search, it would seem that the Court properly 
found no constitutional distinction between the criminal arrest and the 
administrative arrest for deportation. 
James]. White 
20For the circumstances under which such arrest is proper, see PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 
870 (1957). For a study of arres~ in which only 3% were found to have been made with 
a warrant, see Comment, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952). 
21 INS "operating instructions" issued under 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (1958) so provide. 
Principal case at 232. 
22 Studies in at least one state show this procedure to provide almost totally in• 
effective protection. GARRINGER, PROCEDURE BEFORE COMMITIING MAGISTRATES IN PENNSYL• 
VANIA 42 (1947); SADLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 72 (2d ed. 1937). 
23 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. 
24 The district courts now have the exclusive right to suppress evidence. FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 41 (e). This power had also been enjoyed by the commissioners under Act of June 15, 
1917, ch. 30, §§ 15-16, 40 Stat. 229 (1917). 
